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The Development of the Hungarian Banking Sector Prior 
to Basel II 
Roland Attila Csizmazia* 
Abstract 
Although the economic transition started in the early of 1990s, Hungary had a pioneer role in 
introducing the two-tier banking system within the former Soviet Eastern Block. The modernization of 
the banking system was unexpectedly far-reaching as Western banks were allowed to participate in the 
market. The Hungarian banking system was widely government run before the first commercial bank 
was opened by the National Bank of Hungary and five foreign commercial banks were established in 
1979. The pioneer role was maintained even during the transition years when foreign-owned 
commercial banks could establish their subsidiaries. This paper attempts to examine the performance of 
the Hungarian banking sector once foreign investments occurred, and its functions as well as its stability 
in the transition period before the implementation of the Basel II Accord. It also reveals the doubts 
policy makers had about the Basel II Accord and its affect on the lending behavior of banks.  
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Introduction 
Hungary was among the pioneers in the Eastern Block to attempt to develop a healthy 
bank system from its “mono-bank system” of the late regime. This “mono-bank system” 
represented the financial sector within the boundaries of the block broadly. Due to its inherent 
importance in a country’s economy, the financial sector has always been influenced by politics 
considerably. The state has started to open up its economy and its close business relations with 
Western Europe early. It has received extensive foreign direct investments from the 1970s. 
Inevitably, such activities have led to a larger foreign bank involvement. To enable investments 
of foreign banks, reforms had to be introduced. Surprisingly, the state could introduce its two-
tier banking system – as the first Central and Eastern European country – in an early stage long 
before the political change could happen following the fall of Iron Curtain. Accordingly, the 
Hungarian National Bank (also Central Bank of Hungary or MNB) proactively established a bank 
– Central-European International Bank Ltd or as widely known CIB – together with five 
renowned international commercial banks in 1979 (Majnoni et al., 2003). CIB was an offshore-
like dollar based bank prior to political opening and carried out corporate banking functions in 
convertible currencies, but not in domestic currency, Hungarian Forint (Abel and Polivka, 1997). 
At the end of 1980s the increasing demand pushed the bank forward to establish an onshore 
bank to become capable to perform commercial banking services also in Hungarian Forint.  
Various financial intermediaries and quasi banks were founded which could carry out 
bank-like functions, but their significance remained low in a transition economy. Still, many of 
them gained importance when they converted into banks, e.g., Inter-Europa Bank of which the 
predecessor in title was a limited partnership – founded 1982 – with the objective to support 
incentive investments into the development of foreign trade (Abel and Polivka, 1997). The 
modernization has not stopped by then. The foundations of current financial system were 
established by 1989. Even though the functions of financial intermediaries were more and more 
realized, the healthy competition within the sector lagged behind. This was also underpinned 
by the lack of statistical correlations between the price of bonds, the coupon on them and the 
actual risk and profit position of the issuing corporations (Murphy and Sabon, 1992). 
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At the beginning of 1990s structural changes were faster than the state could have 
reacted and an early destabilization showed importance of a regulatory framework. The 
stability of financial sector has continuously seen as a necessary precondition for development. 
Accordingly, regulations and reforms were introduced and enforced by law. Privatization of 
banks and foreign ownership in banking sector contributed largely to a successful 
transformation of the planned economy. Besides, Hungary could pursue the membership in the 
EU and became a member state in 2004. As a result Hungary has to standardize and align its 
regulations which needed to become EU-conform.  
Transition of financial system 
As the banking functions have been liberalized the competition has intensified. After the 
enormous Soviet impact on the Eastern European Block has diminished it could relieve from the 
long period of regime regulations. Most countries of the block, among them Hungary, could 
push forward for democratization and opening of their markets unrestrictedly. The 1996 Act on 
Credit Institutions allowed banks to conduct more services, such as investment transactions 
which were restricted by the Act on Securities earlier. From 1999 commercial banks could 
obtain license to transact government securities and also to offer full range investment banking 
(Majnoni et al., 2003).  
The privatization began and the framework for a new economy order was created along 
with the political transformation. Consequently, foreign banks could establish their fully owned 
subsidiaries. The liberalization of banking activities – such as facilitating loans, investment 
banking and foreign exchange trades – process followed the political changes. Hungary pinned 
down itself to join the European Union by the fastest feasible time and attempted to 
implement regulations to conform the prerequisites set by the EU. However, Hungary could 
enter the EU in 2004, numerous decision makers warned from an early joining of Euro zone as 
the country’s economy remained fragile as a strong currency has not been yet desired. 
Although the following years were represented by sometimes accelerating and sometimes 
slowing growth mostly, a few setbacks were unavoidable inherent to the system. Regional 
discrepancies appeared and the speed of growth halted or even took an unwanted direction, 
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thus turned into recession especially as the region was highly influenced by the financial crisis 
of 2008.  
As mentioned above the decentralization of functions such as foreign exchange banking 
activities, took several years. Till 1992 the foreign currency was limited by the Central Bank, but 
the purchase of foreign currency became free to trade. From this time the banks could trade in 
foreign currencies with each other. Consequently, a new instrument could be applied by the 
Central Bank – the intervention in foreign exchange market.  
Inflation and foreign exchange 
From the beginning of transition Hungary needed to consider methods to stabilize 
inflation and introduce monetary policy strategies to drastically slash the extremely high 
inflation rate. In comparison to the years before the stabilization policy of 1995 the inflation has 
declined permanently although it still remained at a double-digit before 2000 (as described by 
Figure 1). Furthermore, the policy has helped to create internal and external equilibrium with 
wider flexibility of exchange rate. To control foreign exchange, Hungary used a crawling band 
for the nominal system and its currency basket was adjusted periodically. In 1995 the forward 
exchange rate – thus previously announced rate – was implemented. The band width was one 
of the narrowest in the region, but as it could be widened more sterilized foreign exchange 
interventions were facilitated (Blejer and Skreb, 1999). The Central Bank initiated an exchange 
of foreign exchange deposits that targeted the transformation of the long-term credits from 
abroad and the short-term exchange sources into long-term credits based on the domestic 
currency – also the main target was reached because the exchange risk could be terminated. All 
these regulations aimed to decrease the rate of inflation that has been successfully reached by 
the end of the 20th century. 
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Figure 1: Inflation rate in Hungary between 1990 and 2000 (KSH, 2009) 
Hungary needed sufficient funding for successful transition of its economy. As this was 
not available domestically, the foreign capital inflow was inevitable for the country’s 
development. Companies which invested in the country usually trusted their own banks long-
term. Obviously, the state needed to allow the entrance of financial institutes and had to create 
an environment that preferred both green-field investments and investments into banks which 
were sold through privatization. 
Fears vs. positive contribution of foreign ownership  
The labor market has undergone a massive modification parallel to the radical changes 
in economy. Based on the structural deficiencies, the more and more noticeable distortions in 
economy caused rapidly increasing unemployment that was an unknown phenomenon before 
1990s. The unemployment rate of over 12 per cent was reached in 1993. From that peak the 
rate fell again, but remained high during after the turn of century (Felkai, 2011). Consequently, 
it is well understandable that not each of the former Eastern Block members has welcome 
foreign investments without doubts. 
A centrally planned economy or a concentrated financial sector can successfully hinder 
the easy entrance of foreign corporations and the competition among the functioning 
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participants which then remain protected. They also lack of incentives for innovation and 
development of services to customers lack. Besides, the banking sector is highly regulated due 
to the fear of bankruptcy effects potentially caused by the entrance of new or foreign 
corporations. These and similar actions usually have detained banks from entering the 
transition economy countries. Once again, Hungary showed a different picture being the most 
hospitable country at the time of the transforming economy. The entrance of banks which 
found their subsidiaries in the country is characterized by negative assumptions and fears as 
well as – fortunately – by positive effects. The latter ones could be observed in Hungary 
predominantly. 
Wachtel (1997) stated that the liberalization of market was so rapid that regulations 
could not be introduced effectively before the entrance of foreign banks. While in a few 
countries the new entrants were a source of speculations, in Hungary many of them faced 
losses. Accordingly, legislation was forced to work out stringent conditions for new entrants.  
  Obviously, there is a wide range of reasons why foreign banks enter the markets. 
Legislation must consider and prepare for the danger of the entrances, such as a high 
probability of foreign influence over capital flows and high competition within the financial 
sector. Besides, there might be an interest conflict between legislation and foreign entrants as 
well as existent participants and entrants which also are characterized by distinct corporate 
culture. The fears of foreign influence are related to both financial colonization and the 
opposition of foreign participation in economic activities and processes. Often these fears are 
aggravated by nationalism. It is rather the inflow of working capitals that could lead to foreign 
dependency and not the functions of foreign banks. The lack of sufficient savings characterized 
the countries of once Eastern Block. Thus, there was no accumulated capital that could have 
contributed to the rapid development and could have been spent to finance it. Therefore, it 
would not have been reasonable to restrict or even stop the capital inflow. Nevertheless, 
legislation had to resist and had to inspect portfolio investments as danger has been inherent in 
their functions. They could become the source of potential macroeconomic destabilizations. 
There was a need for finding the way to fix investments – especially in privatization this 
supported those mainly strategic investors who offered and promised not only a preferable 
purchase price but also capital injections (Várhegyi, 2002 and Majnoni et al., 2003). Wachtel 
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(1997) argues that the second argument likewise stands on no solid ground. Thus, protection of 
developing sectors do not refer to banks since they do not import products – and consequently 
do not compete with domestic manufacturers – but provide financial services in the host 
country. Besides, if foreign entrance would not have happened no domestic bank would have 
been squeezed to raise its service quality. The other fear related factors – such as conflicting 
interest and regulatory differences – have not been as significant based on the intension of 
joining the EU as the ones described above.  
Certainly, foreign banks had a few advantages against the domestic banks in transition 
economies due to their lasting functions in their domestic markets. They could contribute with 
early development of services, while the domestic banks of host countries had problems with 
bad performing loan portfolios. Additionally, the existent personnel were not interested in 
innovating services. The entrance of Citibank provides a good example based on the fact that 
they could introduce ATM networks to wealthy clients before other banks followed (Wachtel, 
1997). Besides, their size and technological advances contributed to their economies of scale 
and wide diversification, while Hungarian banks could not compete based on their inefficient 
and costly transaction processing. As examples Budapest Bank with its technology import and 
Creditanstalt with the largest transaction of Budapest Stock Exchange are worth to note 
(Wachtel, 1997).  
Among the primary drivers for establishing presence – by founding subsidiaries – the 
demand of banks’ original domestic clientele for transaction and lending services and the 
growing number of expatriates with a demand for quality services were perhaps the most 
significant. Later, in addition to the domestic exporting sector the quality – high yield – clients 
were targeted by the foreign banks with their more and more differentiated products and 
services. The impact of liberalization brought euphoria and tens of new financial institutions, 
branches of banks were established. Due to the early high yields banks increased their total 
assets rapidly. The soft and improper or even deficient regulations have not hindered this 
hazardous development in Hungary. The bank sector accounting for the largest part of financial 
sector was enjoying an extensive competition with intensively widening range of services till 
1993 (Ábel and Polivka, 1998).  
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Reforms in banking system 
Through the extensive structural changes large banks lost approximately one third of 
their clientele. Despite the shrinking market share of large banks they further dominated the 
market. The euphoria allowed an unforeseen excessive risk-taking. This directly has led to 
imminent instability which could be solved only with radical intervention and support by the 
legislation. Thus, there has been an urgent demand for a proper legal framework. At the 
beginning the juridical environment was incredibly poor. The Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 
1992. Instead of solving issues it aggravated them. Accordingly, more than 4,000 bankruptcy 
cases were opened. Therefore a prompt amendment was necessary which was introduced in 
1993 and has led to sharp decline in number of cases (Eros et al., 2006). Yet the regulations and 
the “loan consolidation program” have still remained deficient and have brought only short 
term improvement (Balassa, 1996). Banks continued to be disadvantaged in liquidation 
processes and as a result corporate loans were not provided at all. However, the capital 
adequacy ratios were increased; the issues about the banks’ under-capitalization have not been 
solved. There was an inevitable need for recapitalization by the government – completed by 
1994 – in over 75 per cent of the concerned banks (Majnoni et al., 2003).  
In the Central and Eastern European region three methods of privatization of banks 
were applied: (1) the sale of shares via public offerings on the domestic stock exchange 
targeting small investors, (2) through the search for strategic foreign investors and (3) through 
voucher privatization in that local citizens could purchase a book of vouchers that represent 
potential shares in any state-owned company inexpensively (Várhegyi, 2001a). In Hungary the 
first and second methods of privatization were deployed. The initial step was launched 
following the political change and it created an environment that allowed foreign strategic 
investors (with a share of over 25 per cent) to participate in the market. Consequently, the 
state’s share in banking sector declined sharply reaching a 39 per cent share (Majnoni et al., 
2003). Meanwhile, new banks were founded by foreign and domestic entities. Within the 
frames of the second method the partial transfer of ownership was carried out – 25 per cent 
remained in public hands – whereas the state preferred domestic ownership and did not allow 
any other strategic ownership, but basically highly diversified ownership structure. The 
privatization can be regarded as completed since 1997. 
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Even though the development has continued and the performance of financial sector 
has increased, the role of financial sector could not increase its significance and could not 
become stronger. The average income of households has been limited compared to banks in 
the EU and Hungary has had to fight with a huge size of black and grey economy. The effect was 
two-fold: on the one hand, the state has been unable to increase its tax income and on the 
other hands, the deposit rate in the financial sector could not have been increased easily. New 
subsidiaries and branches needed vast investments in technology which meant high reserves 
for the participants.  
Stability in the system 
The role of foreign investors has been extremely significant. Banks with foreign 
ownership have controlled over 90 per cent of assets in banking sector in 1999 and 2000. The 
domination banking sector within the entire financial sector became similar to the EU average. 
At the beginning of the 1990s loans given by resident banks to non-financial corporations and 
households account for 27 per cent of GDP the while this ratio was around 90-100 per cent 
during the examined period of time (Várhegyi, 2002). The obvious reason is that the transition 
economy showed unpredictable creditworthiness as no statistical data was available.  
 
Figure 2: Household debt to GDP change in percentage, (MNB, 2010) 
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Figure 3: Growth of household debt to gross disposable income in percentage, (OECD, 2012) 
While Várhegyi (2002) argues that the loans of households were low, the data both from 
Central Bank of Hungary (2010) in Figure 2 and from OECD (2012) in Figure 3 represent a more 
or less steep increase in the comparison of GDP and gross disposable income (OECD 2012 and 
MNB 2010). Moreover, the problem of larger loans in foreign currencies amplified the lurch of 
instability. 
Table 1: Stability of Hungarian bank sector (Várhegyi, 2002) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Non-performing loans  
(in percentage of 
assets) 
7.4 4.0 3.2 1.8 2.6 2.0 
Capital adequacy ratio 18.3 18.9 17.3 9.9 15.0 15.2 
 
The balance sheet structure in Hungarian banking sector has developed from the second 
half of 1990s and the quality of asset portfolio has largely improved. By 2000, the analysis 
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depicts that the capital adequacy ratio has been around 15 per cent that represented a stable 
and well-capitalized sector (see Table 1). It is notable that the importance of client – both 
corporate and household – deposits has increased to a cumulated level of around 50 per cent 
within the structure of resident banks’ liabilities (Várhegyi, 2002). These improvements – 
although problems mentioned in the above paragraph destabilized the sector later again – 
reflect a more and more stable financial sector. 
Table 2: Market concentration in bank sector (Várhegyi, 2001b) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
HHI 1235 1139 997 953 922 888 
 
According to Várhegyi (2001a) the concentration in the Hungarian banking sector is 
moderate and has decreased through the time. Based on HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index) the 
calculations show (in Table 2) that the Hungarian banking sector was characterized by 
moderate concentration and has become non-concentrated in 1997. As no significant mergers 
and acquisitions occurred on the market the concentration remained low before the 
implementation of Basel II Accord. It is to be mentioned that the calculation of index excluded 
he largest domestic bank, OTP, has dominated the household deposits and loans, even though 
its market share significantly declined – by about 10 per cent by 1997. If concentration and 
competition are measured it is important to measure the distance of market shares between 
the first and second largest banks in the market (Molyneaux, 1999). In the light of this result, 
the concentration seems to be much higher and the competition for household clients seems to 
be much lower, especially if the third largest bank will be observed for its market shares. The 
distance can be measured by approximately 30 per cent (Várhegyi, 2001b). 
Referring to the performance of banks the banking sector the early years the key 
indicator such as return on equity and return on assets provide – although the values fluctuated 
to some extent – a favourable trend. The loss-making year excludes two loss-making banks that 
had state interventions (liquidation and bail-out). It is worth to note that the profitability of 
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Hungarian banking sector has remained adequate since privatization – see Table 3 – despite of 
early developments and structural deficiencies of the changing economy (Várhegyi, 2002).  
Table 3: Efficiency in Hungarian bank sector – values are pre-tax in percentage (Várhegyi, 2002 
and Central Bank of Hungary) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Return on Assets  1.5 1.7 1.3 -2.1 0.6 1.3 
Return on Equity 18.2 20.6 14.3 -25.4 6.3 15.1 
 
Further, the green-field foreign banks have been more profitable in average than those 
which were privatized due to their consequent early cost-efficiencies. Green-field investments 
successfully transferred the parent company’s culture and the already created products and 
services (Várhegyi, 2002). The lower than expected performance of the majority of privatized 
banks can be regarded as a consequence of the bad legacy originating from high operating and 
transaction costs, inefficient branch networks, low application of IT and technology as well as 
low-quality clientele (Majnoni et al., 2003). 
The members of Eastern Block have decided to pursue entering the EU to enjoy the 
advantages of free the three basic principles – free move of capital, of people and of labor as 
well as of services, and beyond. As Hungary has started the negotiations in 1998, the legislation 
had to align the regulations to get them EU-conform. The banking sector was one of the first 
that had been largely covered before the negotiations were opened. 
Adoption of international regulations 
Risk is generally influenced by different complex factors in the financial sector. Among 
the factors, the most significant ones are: the general economic trend, modifications in 
organizational structure of the bank, adopting financial decisions and directives, political and 
economic circumstances. The Basel Committee has identified eight categories of risks: credit 
risk, country risk, transfer risk, market risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, operational risk, legal 
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risk and the reputation risk. To ensure higher stability, regulations were introduced and 
adopted. Among these the most relevant regulations have been CAD I (along with Basel I), CAD 
II (as an extension) and Basel II prior to the crisis of 2008. 
While Basel I of 1988 has not been extensive at all, CAD II and Basel II were. Basel I 
primarily focused on credit risk and related risk-weighting of assets. The assets of banks had to 
be classified and arrange into five categories according to their credit risk. International banks 
have been required to hold capital at least at a level of 8 per cent of their risk-weighted assets. 
It was enforced by law in G-10 countries in 1992. 
The Capital Adequacy Directive or CAD was elaborated by the European Union which aimed 
to establish minimal uniform capital requirements for both banking firms and investment firms. 
The first directive was issued in 1993 and then was revised in 1998. As fundamental reasons the 
following points can be considered: 
 EU is set of countries with many different regulations. Again and again a standardized 
approach was required especially as the number of foreign direct investments 
increased rapidly following the political changes in non-EU member countries; 
 lack of definitions and regulations characterized the financial sector, e.g., risks for 
various investments had to be defined, capital requirements needed to become 
uniform;  
 to reach common standard for both monitoring and managing lending engagements;  
 demand for common rules related to market consolidation and market risk; 
 the effort to remove barriers between investment banking and commercial banking in 
the interest of individual approach. 
 
CAD I has basically set fundamental conditions for capital adequacy requirement of 
investment and securities firms. The capital requirement for general risk was set at 8 per cent, 
while for specific risk at 4 per cent (Horvátová et al., 2005). CAD I also stipulated the initial 
capitals required to establish investment companies. The initial capital was set to be EUR 
125,000 for investment firms with functions to receive, transmit and execute investors’ orders 
for financial instruments and to manage individual portfolios of investments. The initial capital 
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requirement was EUR 50,000 for those investment firms which were not authorized to hold 
clients’ money and securities. All the other institutions should had an initial capital of EUR 
730,000.  
CAD II was adopted in 1998 with the focus on two main areas: (1) internal models of banks 
and (2) commodity risks. The regulation allowed financial institutions to deploy their own risk 
management and risk measurement models to calculate risk probabilities more accurately. The 
participants could evaluate their gold positions, derivatives and foreign currency positions. It 
modified some of the non-balance items and improved the OTC derivative regulations to target 
risk mitigation, etc. In comparison with CAD II, Basel II accords are recommendations on the 
regulations of financial sector worldwide and have a broader view. Besides, Basel II accords 
introduce operational risk. The intension was to create an international standard for banking 
regulators to control the amount of capital that banks need to reserve to defend themselves 
against the various types of financial and operational risks. 
The Capital Adequacy Directives were replaced by Capital Requirements Directives starting 
in to comply with Basel II Accord throughout the EU. Table 4 provides a snapshot of 
international regulations and the time when they were adopted. 
Table 4: Regulations and their adoption in overview (Mérő, 2002) 
International Regulation Adoption in EU  Adoption in Hungary 
Basel I. 1989 1992 
CAD I. 1993 - 
CAD II. 1998 2001 
Basel II. Q4 of 2006 Q4 of 2006 
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The Hungarian authorities have broadly agreed with the main objective of the Basel II 
Accords, namely to strengthen the relationship between regulatory and economic capital while 
ensuring and maintaining the average level of capital in the financial sector. Still, the authorities 
(Central Bank of Hungary) have raised concerns on a few points of the directives of Basel II. Due 
to the greater risk-sensitivity based on Basel II, there has been a need for an additional analysis 
of the impact on pro-cyclicality of the banking activity. Pro-cyclicality refers to the strong 
correlation between the real-economic and lending cycles. Hungarian authorities believe that 
this existent cyclical behavior will be even strengthened. Consequently, this may lower lending 
possibilities and the pro-cyclicality of capital adequacy would be intensified. Besides, the 
Hungarian financial sector has just gone through a huge structural change that may influence 
transparency between possible pro-cyclical banking behavior and structural changes. The Basel 
II Accord with intensifies the work with internal rating rather portfolio based and not on an 
individual basis, whereas small economies such as the Hungarian economy, may not be 
sufficient to prepare risk classification, if no adequate data is available and the number of 
members within the portfolio remains insufficient for the calculations. Therefore, it would be 
essential to carry out a domestic impact analysis of the preferential treatment of SME loans 
(Mérô et al., 2003).  
Moreover, authorities argued that the risk weighting should not rise from 0 to 20 per 
cent, but the EU member states should generally maintain the 0 per cent risk weight for the 
standardized approach to calculate risk. The IRB (Internal Rating-Base) approach has seemed to 
be difficult and its complexity has not allowed any simple explanation even for its application. 
Thus, a partial use of IRB approach might be satisfactory in practice. These are just a few of the 
criticisms which have been recommended to reach reasonable amendments of Basel II. It 
remains to be seen if any of them would have been considered to be implemented in the 
directive. 
Conclusion 
Hungary has been successful in creating a comfortable environment for foreign 
investments not just in production but also in service sector, such as the financial sector. The 
authorities could use instruments to combat the danger of freely fluctuating foreign exchange 
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by gradually freeing the currency trade. Additionally, disinflationary measures were introduced 
to decrease inflation. However, the foreign ownership in a banking sector is not always 
welcome based on its outstanding role in the economy, the state believed that the fears related 
to foreign influence may not be justified largely, if the entrance is well regulated. The successful 
change of economy structure needed the capital inflows, which were positively affected by the 
activities of banks, especially those with foreign ownership.  
Through the liberalization of the market green-field investments and privatization could 
be carried out. To protect the state interest, the privatization followed a two-step strategy. 
First, strategic investors could gain at least 25 per cent stake in the sold banks. During the 
second round of privatization, the largest domestic bank OTP was sold to no strategic investors. 
This created a well diversified ownership structure for the bank. 
While foreign ownership accounted for about 90 per cent of assets of banks the 
domination of banking sector has reached a level similar to the EU average. The household debt 
remained low during the 1990s, but grew continuously after the century turn. The loans in 
foreign currency – due to their low interest rate – were attractive for households. 
Unfortunately, the growth became a destabilizing factor during the crisis of 2008. The 
performance of the banking sector has also been satisfactory, although it was not characterized 
by high competition and – if excluded the OTP – by high concentration.  
The capital adequacy ratio remained high that enabled banks to comply with 
international directives – enforced by law in Hungary as well – easily. Hence the market size 
may complicate the adoption of directives such as Basel II in the future; constructive criticism 
was created by the authorities to depict problems of regulations 
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